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Abstract
The paper briefly reviews what is encompassed in the term ministerial responsibility in Ita-
lian and Hellenic constitutional system. In this respect, the paper seeks to define the key 
concept of political ministerial responsibility, and also the distinction between collective 
and individual ministerial responsibility in the frame of the Hellenic and Italian parlia-
mentary system. It then presents an overview of the substantive and procedural rules on 
such responsibility found in the Constitution of Greece, Constitution of Italy, Hellenic Par-
liament’s Standing Orders, Italian Parliament’s Order. This is followed by an assessment of 
basic concerns related to the actual application of the institution of ministerial responsibi-
lity. In conclusion, the paper presents some normative reflections on the issue.
Streszczenie
Polityczna odpowiedzialność ministrów w Grecji i we Włoszech
Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy zagadnienia politycznej odpowiedzialności ministerialnej 
w greckim i włoskim systemie konstytucyjnym. Analizie została poddana kluczowa kon-
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cepcja politycznej odpowiedzialności ministrów, a także rozróżnienie między solidarną 
i indywidualną odpowiedzialnością ministerialną w ramach greckiego i włoskiego syste-
mu parlamentarnego. W kolejnej części artykułu zostały omówione przepisy materialne 
i proceduralne w odniesieniu do omawianego problemu, zawarte w Konstytucji Grecji, 
Konstytucji Włoch oraz w regulaminach parlamentarnych obu państw. Zostały przedsta-
wione podstawowe problemy związane z faktycznym stosowaniem instytucji ministerial-
nej odpowiedzialności oraz kilka uwagę natury normatywnej omawianego zagadnienia.
*
I. Introduction
The institution of the responsibility of the state government highest officials 
constitutes an eminent component of modern parliamentary democracy since 
democracy makes no sense without accountability and responsibility of the 
state authorities3. The responsibility of ministers in particular forms a funda-
mental constitutional guarantee of the democratic principle itself4.
In legal theory, ministerial responsibility is traditionally classified into politi-
cal responsibility and (stricto sensu) legal responsibility, where criminal liability5 
3 According to Ulr. Scheuner (as cited by B. Lutterbeck, Parlament und Information, Eine 
informationstheoretische und verfasungsrechtliche Untersuchung, München–Wien 1977, p. 161): 
“Verantwortung und Kontrolle bilden Grundelemente einer demokratischen Verfassungsordnung”. 
Also, see P. Pararas, Σύνταγμα 1975 – Corpus, III, άρθρα 81–92, Κυβέρνηση – Δικαστική εξουσία Ι, 
Athens–Thessaloniki 2004, p. 141.
4 According to N.I. Saripolos, the responsibility of public authorities is “the most powerful 
guarantee to ensure the compliance to the Constitution” [as translated] (as cited by Ant. 
Manitakis, Ελληνικό Συνταγματικό δίκαιο, vol. Ι, Athens–Thessaloniki 2004, pp. 439–440). 
See also Ar. Manesis, Αι εγγυήσεις τηρήσεως του Συντάγματος, vol. ΙΙ, Athens 1965, p. 505.
5 On criminal ministerial responsibility in Greece, see An. Loverdos, Η ποινική ευθύνη 
των μελών της Κυβέρνησης και των Υφυπουργών στο κοινοβουλευτικό πολίτευμα, Athens–
Komotini 1995, P. Pararas, op.cit., pp. 221–247, Ath. Raikos, Συνταγματικό Δίκαιο, vol. Ι-Β, 
Athens–Komotini 2009, pp. 958–966, 971–1010. For a focus on the institution of criminal 
ministerial responsibility before and after the Constitutional Revision of 2008, see K. Mavrias, 
Συνταγματικό δίκαιο, Athens 2014, pp. 590–618. For a comparative law study on criminal 
ministerial liability, see S. Steinbarth, Das Institut der Präsidenten- und Ministeranklage in 
rechtshistorischer und rechtsvergleichender Prespektive, Baden-Baden 2011, Eur. Besila-Vika, 
115Marianthi Kalyviotou, Małgorzata Lorencka • Political ministerial responsibility
and civil liability6 are to be found. Although each type of responsibility is au-
tonomous, distinct and separate institution as far as it concerns the purpose 
of each one, the procedure to be followed, and the sanctions, which may be 
imposed on Ministers, they have common historical roots in British parlia-
mentary practice in the Middle Ages7. Even now, they share the same poli-
tiological aspiration: to impose sanction to the Ministers for improper poli-
tical manipulations that have damaged the state, to ensure a proper exercise 
of state powers and to reduce the risk of their abuse8. Nevertheless, the mo-
dern approach to the institution of political ministerial responsibility accla-
im it as a non-criminal institution who apply to acts and omissions of the Ca-
binet (acting either individually or collectively) which are prejudicial to the 
public interest.
The legal nature of political responsibility is expressed by the fact that the-
re are legal provisions setting out the relevant procedures and leading to se-
rious legal consequences9. On the opposite side stands the so-called informal 
or diffuse political responsibility, which lies beyond the legal sphere, and de-
notes the influence of governmental and ministerial maneuvers on the pu-
blic opinion and implies political scorn. This type of responsibility indicates 
the political consequences, the political cost of the acts and omissions of the 
government and its members, which could lead to dissatisfaction of the ci-
tizens and, at its strongest form, to losing elections. In this paper, only legal 
Ο θεσμός της ποινικής ευθύνης των Υπουργών στο ελληνικό και συγκριτικό συνταγματικό δίκαιο, 
Athens 1985, N. Soilentakis, Υπουργοί στο Ειδικό Δικαστήριο (1821–2000), Athens 2005.
6 See K. Mavrias, Συνταγματικό..., op.cit., pp. 617–618, Ath. Raikos, Συνταγματικό..., 
op.cit., pp. 966–967.
7 See I. Aravantinos, Πραγματεία περί ευθύνης των ηγεμόνων και των υπουργών, Athens 
1880, pp. 47–137, An. Loverdos, Κυβέρνηση, συλλογική λειτουργία και πολιτική ευθύνη, Athens–
Komotini 1991, pp. 77–80. For a focus on the historical development of the responsibility of 
public authorities, see Eur. Besila-Vika, Ο θεσμός..., op.cit., pp. 7–8.
8 See A. Loverdos, Η ποινική..., op.cit., pp. 33–36, 40–46, P. Mantzoufas, Η σχέση πολιτικής 
και ποινικής ευθύνης των μελών της Κυβέρνησης, https://www.constitutionalism.gr/1832-i-
shesi-politikis-kai-poinikis-eytynis-twn-melwn-t; Z. Loncar, Ministerial Responsibility: 
Regulations and Practical Issues in the Republic of Serbia, Croatian and Comparative Public 
Administation, pp. 1171–1198 (1172).
9 See G. Witte-Wegmann, Recht und Kontrollfunktion der Großen, Kleinen und Mündlichen 
Anfragen im Deutschen Bundestag, Berlin 1972, p. 112, Eur. Besila-Vika, Ο θεσμός..., op.cit., p. 9, 
K. Georgopoulos, Επίτομο συνταγματικό δίκαιο, Athens–Komotini 2001, p. 372.
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political responsibility as it is set out in Greek and Italian public law is being 
presented and analyzed.
II. Political ministerial responsibility in Greece
Under the Hellenic system of representative democracy, ministers are respon-
sible to Parliament. Political ministerial responsibility, also called parliamen-
tary responsibility, requires a parliamentary system10. In such an institutio-
nal environment, where the Cabinet is dependent on Parliament’s confidence, 
political ministerial responsibility confirms that the Cabinet is accountable 
for the confidence it enjoys as well as for the entire governmental activity it 
undertakes due to Parliament’s confidence. Under the operation of the prin-
ciple of the Cabinet’s accountability, which forms the core of the parliamen-
tary system, the Cabinet is obliged to explain the way it used the confiden-
ce of the Parliament.
All Hellenic constitutions, even the revolutionary ones, lay down rules 
for the institution of ministerial responsibility. The first Hellenic constitu-
tion to include explicitly the institution of political ministerial responsibility 
is the Constitution of 184411. Since then all Hellenic constitutions12 contain 
rules pertaining to political responsibility. Regardless of constitutional revi-
sions in Greece, the institution of political ministerial responsibility was not 
subject to any significant changes.
In the current Constitution of Greece13 the political responsibility of the 
Cabinet is regulated in Article 85. Its first sentence stipulates that “The mem-
bers of the Cabinet and the Undersecretaries shall be collectively responsible 
for general Government policy, and each of them severally for the actions or 
10 See K. Mavrias, Συνταγματικό..., op.cit., p. 617.
11 Art. 82 of the Hellenic Constitution of 1844: “There cannot be any written or oral King’s 
command that would lead to exemption of the ministerial responsibility” [translated].
12 The Constitutions of the Greek State, which have been voted since 1845, are the 
following ones: Constitution of Greece (1864), Constitution of Greece (1911), Constitution of 
Greece (1925), Constitution of the Hellenic Republic (1927), Constitution of Greece (1952), 
and Constitution of Greece (1975).
13 The Constitution of Greece translated in English, French and German is available at: 
http://www.parliament.gr/en/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Syntagma/.
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omissions within his powers, according to the provisions of statutes on the 
liability of Ministers”14.
As a starting point of the analysis of political responsibility, it is clear that 
the subject matter of that institution is establishing whether the ministers’ 
actions are politically opportune. Political responsibility does not necessari-
ly assume a violation of a disposition of a legal norm (which, on the contrary, 
is a prerequisite for criminal and civil liability). Ministers may be considered 
politically responsible not only for some unlawful action under the criminal 
or civil legislation but also for any ministerial action, which is inconsistent 
with the political trust they had been vested with.
According to the constitutional provision of Art. 85, political responsibili-
ty is applied to the “members of the Cabinet”, i.e. the Prime Minister and the 
Ministers15, and to the undersecretaries (who are considered as members of 
the Cabinet)16. In other words, political responsibility in Greece is formed as 
cabinet collective responsibility, also known as collective ministerial respon-
sibility, and also as individual ministerial responsibility.
Collective ministerial responsibility is based on the principle of collective 
action of the Government. All members of the Cabinet share the obligation 
of determining and directing the general policy of the country17. Therefore, 
Ministers are collectively responsible for acts and omissions in the area of 
competence of the Cabinet18. When Parliament withdraws its confidence for 
the Cabinet, the Cabinet has to resign, no matter whether all Ministers were 
actually involved in the decision that caused the motion of censure, or not. 
14 The constitutional provision of Art. 85 first sentence has been criticized for being 
“technically unfortunate”, since political responsibility regulated by law (statute) is unconceivable. 
It is obvious that political and criminal ministerial responsibility are unfortunately blended 
in this constitutional provision. On this issue, see K. Mavrias, Συνταγματικό..., op.cit., p. 584.
15 See Article 81 par. 1 first sentence of the Constitution of Greece: “The Cabinet, which 
shall be composed of the Prime Minister and the Ministers, constitutes the Government”.
16 According to Art. 83 par. 2 of the Constitution, Undersecretaries exercise the powers 
vested in them by joint decision of the Prime Minister and the competent Minister. On political 
responsibility of Undersecretaries, see P. Pararas, op.cit., pp. 211–212.
17 See Art. 82 par. 1 of the Constitution: “The Government shall define and direct the general 
policy of the Country, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the laws”.
18 On the precise scope of ministerial responsibility, see M. Kalyviotou, Κοινοβουλευτικός 
έλεγχος, Συνταγματικό πλαίσιο και όρια, Athens–Thessaloniki 2017, pp. 113–206.
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In this respect, there is a constitutional convention that all members of the 
Cabinet support all governmental decisions made in Cabinet.
Individual ministerial responsibility states that each Minister is responsi-
ble for his actions or omissions as well as of his subordinates at the Ministry 
(and the Ministry’s agencies and departments) and of persons under his su-
pervision19. In case of any wrongdoing or mistake, the Minister can be called 
to correct the situation, to apologize, and even in some cases to resign from 
a cabinet position. The charge of political responsibility may result, at its most 
extreme form, that the Minister concerned loses his office or is made to resign 
either by the Prime Minister or because of a motion of censure to resign20. 
If parliamentary confidence is withdrawn from one member of the govern-
ment, resignation is obligatory, theoretically, for this member only. Due to the 
collective responsibility of the government and the solidarity of its members, 
resignation will usually be collective21.
Let it be noted that although the subject matter of political responsibility 
may not be precisely regulated, the procedure for establishing this responsi-
bility is adequately regulated. In Greece political ministerial responsibility is 
an institution that is formulated through certain (parliamentary) procedures 
set out in Articles 84 and 85 of the Constitution and specified in the provi-
sions of the Hellenic Parliament’s Standing Orders22.
The procedural model for holding the cabinet and its ministers politically 
responsible adopted in Hellenic constitutional system is the institution of par-
liamentary control. The Government is submitted to parliamentary control ac-
cording to the Constitution, following the procedure set out in the Parliament’s 
Standing Orders. The rules on parliamentary control cover the initiation of 
proceedings, the legitimate options of all “actors” involved in parliamentary 
control, other procedural elements, and the potential (parliamentary) results.
19 Ibidem.
20 See Ph. Spyropoulos, Th. Fortsakis, Constitutional Law in Greece, the Nederlands 
2009, pp. 141–142.
21 See Ph. Spyropoulos, Th. Fortsakis, op.cit., p. 112. Since now in Greece there has not 
been adopted any motion of censure.
22 The Hellenic Parliament’s Standing Orders (Section of parliamentary business) 
translated in English is available at: https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/
Kanonismos-tis-Voulis (15.09.2018).
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Given that parliamentary oversight seeks to record Goverments’ acts and 
decisions and to highlight their impact to public interest in order to hold the 
executive accountable for the development, implementation and review of 
governmental policy, there are two main control instruments:
(A) Means of parliamentary control aiming at the access of Parliament 
to information on the governmental actions and omissions. Such means are 
principally the following23:
1. Questions24. MPs have the right to submit written questions to Mini-
sters regarding any matter of public importance. Ministers must re-
ply in writing within a set period of time and, if not, the question may 
be discussed before the Plenum. Questions aim at keeping the Parlia-
ment updated on specific issues.
2. Current questions25. MPs have the right to submit written questions to Mi-
nisters as well as the Prime Minister on issues of current political signi-
ficance. Current questions are answered and debated in the Plenum26. 
Such questions not only provide information to the Parliament on topi-
cal subjects, but also aim at supporting political dialogue on such issues.
3. Application to submit documents27. MPs have the right to make a re-
quest, in writing, to Ministers to supply (within a set period of time) 
them with official documents related to issues of public importance. 
When answers require exchange of classified (diplomatic or military or 
national security-related) information, the Minister must not provide 
the required documents28. By these means of parliamentary control, 
the Parliament may acquire additional information on a given subject.
23 More detailed information on the institution of parliamentary oversight in Greece 
and, especially, on the constitutional aspects of its operation, can be found in M. Kalyviotou, 
Κοινοβουλευτικός..., op.cit., pp.113–206.
24 See Art. 126 ff. of the Hellenic Parliament’s Standing Orders.
25 See Art. 129 ff. of the Hellenic Parliament’s Standing Orders.
26 Or in the Recess Section when the Plenum is in recess.
27 See Art. 133 ff. of the Hellenic Parliament’s Standing Orders. A means of parliamentary 
oversight that combines both questions and applications to submit documents is the “question 
with an application to submit documents” (see Art. 124 par. 4 of the Hellenic Parliament’s 
Standing Orders).
28 See Art. 133 par. 4 of the Hellenic Parliament’s Standing Orders: “The Minister must not 
submit documents regarding diplomatic or military or national security secrets”. In this case, the 
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4. Summons to the Ministers29. The Parliament by simple majority may 
call Minister(s) to appear in Parliament, either in Plenum or in par-
liamentary committees, in order to provide clarifications and expla-
nations for specific actions or omissions. Summons to the Ministers 
to appear at the Plenum is a rather obsolete means of parliamentary 
control30. Still it represents the unique constitutional role of Parliament 
in holding the executive accountable for the governmental maneuvers.
5. Petitions31. Citizens (individuals or groups) may address Parliament 
in writing to make complaints or requests (even on private issues of 
restricted public interest). MPs may endorse such petitions. In such 
case, the competent Minister should reply within a set time period. If 
not, the petition may be discussed before the Plenum. Petitions ena-
ble the Parliament to obtain information on how public administra-
tion actually operates and may support political dialogue on how the 
Cabinet supervises it. All the above mentioned procedures are prin-
cipal means of control of the individual ministerial responsibility.
6. Announcements and Declarations of the Government or Governmen-
tal Reporting32. The Prime Minister33 may inform the Parliament abo-
ut any major public matter. Reporting is followed by a relevant debate 
with the Presidents of the rest Parliamentary Groups, in order to express 
their views on the matter. Collective political responsibility consti-
tutes the main viewpoint of the “actors” involved in this procedure.
documents are delivered to the MP who submitted the application or the MP shall be invited 
to inspect their content at the offices of the Parliament.
29 See Art. 66 par. 3 first sentence of the Constitution. This constitutional provision is 
concretized on the Standing Orders as far as it concerns only the parliamentary committees 
(see Art. 37 par. 5 and 41A of the Standing Orders), and not the Plenum. In other words, the 
institution of Summons to the Ministers may be employed before the Plenum by direct reliance 
on Art. 66 par. 3 first sentence of the Constitution. On that institution, see M. Kalyviotou, 
Ερμηνεία επί του άρθρου 66, [in collective work-Kommentar:] Σύνταγμα, κατ’ άρθρο ερμηνεία, 
Athens–Thessaloniki 2017, pp. 1260 ff., A. Dervitsiotis, Η παρουσία των Υπουργών στη Βουλή, 
Athens–Komotini 2007.
30 The relevant procedure in parliamentary committees is frequently employed.
31 See Art. 69 of the Constitution and Art. 125 of the Hellenic Parliament’s Standing Orders.
32 See Art. 142Α of the Hellenic Parliament’s Standing Orders.
33 Also the Ministers. See Art. 142Α of the Hellenic Parliament’s Standing Orders.
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(B) Means of parliamentary control aiming directly at scrutiny and cri-
ticism of executive actions and omissions. Such means are principally the 
following:
1. Interpellations34. MPs have the right to individually or jointly ad-
dress interpellations to any Minister(s) or to the Prime Minister ask-
ing to explain the scope and the motives of governmental actions 
or omissions. MPs may also submit interpellations when they deem 
that a Minister’s reply to a question was inadequate or when they 
have not been given all the documents they have requested. Interpel-
lations are debated in Plenary Sessions. Should there be more than 
one interpellation on the same subject the Parliament may decide 
on their simultaneous debate or even proceed into a general discus-
sion. They are a powerful oversight tool of monitoring governmen-
tal maneuvers and revealing political responsibility of the Cabinet 
(collectively or individually).
2. Current interpellations35. MPs have the right to submit current inter-
pellations to the competent Minister(s) on prominent current affairs. 
Such interpellations are debated in Plenary Sessions36. Current inter-
pellations are usually being employed in order to exercise sharp and 
scathing parliamentary scrutiny of governmental policy.
3. Debate outside the Order of the Day37. The Standing Orders provide 
for those extraordinary debates (limited in number during every par-
liamentary session) initiated mostly (but not exclusively) by the parties 
in the Opposition. They refer to national matters or matters of gener-
al interest. Although their prime aim is to inform Parliament on such 
matters, they constitute high-level discussions, where only the Prime 
Minister (having to appear in person), one or two Ministers and the 
Presidents of the Parliamentary Groups may participate. Under these 
conditions the political debate is lively and this procedure becomes 
a field of intense parliamentary scrutiny. For that reason, these means 
of parliamentary control attract broad media attention.
34 See Art. 134 ff. of the Hellenic Parliament’s Standing Orders.
35 See Art. 138 of the Hellenic Parliament’s Standing Orders.
36 Or in specified sittings of the Recess Section.
37 See Art. 143 of the Hellenic Parliament’s Standing Orders.
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4. Inquiry committees or Investigation committees38. The Plenum may 
establish investigation committees consisting of MPs, who are called 
to investigate issues of public interest, primarily when there are suspi-
cions of offences committed by state government highest officials. Upon 
completion of the investigation, the committee assesses the collected 
evidence and drafts a reasoned report on its findings. It addresses the 
Plenum, while also elaborating on any minority views expressed. Al-
though inquiry committees are laid down in the Constitution and the 
Standing Orders as a parliamentary information tool, they have a con-
siderable political significance because they lead to intensive political 
dialogue on mistakes, wrong decisions or illegal actions or omissions 
of present or past members of the Cabinet.
5. Motion of no confidence or Motion of censure39. The most drastic 
tool of parliamentary control is the motion of censure. Parliament 
may, should at least fifty MPs make such a motion request40 in writ-
ing including explicitly the issues to be debated, withdraw its confi-
dence towards the Government or towards one of its members. If the 
Parliament approves (by absolute majority) the motion of censure, 
whomever the motion was against loses office. Thus, an approved mo-
tion of censure is the ultimate act of the control procedure on polit-
ical responsibility of the government41. It also reveals that ministeri-
al responsibility emerges from their democratic legitimation42, since 
it is connected to the Cabinet’s dependence on parliamentary confi-
38 See Art. 144 ff. of the Hellenic Parliament’s Standing Orders.
39 See Art. 84 of the Constitution and Art. 142 and 141 of the Hellenic Parliament’s 
Standing Orders.
40 Unless signed by the absolute majority, a new motion of censure can only be introduced 
after a period of six month.
41 On the censure of motion, see, among others, D. Filippou, Η πρόταση δυσπιστίας ως μέσον 
άσκησης του κοινοβουλευτικού ελέγχου, Thessaloniki 1990, pp. 25–26; K. Mavrias, Ζητήματα 
λειτουργίας του πολιτεύματος, Athens–Komotini 1993; K. Chryssogonos, Συνταγματικό δίκαιο, 
Athens–Thessaloniki 2014, pp. 519–521, 543–547.
42 See J. Schmidt, Die demokratische Legitimationsfunktion der parlamentarischen 
Kontrolle, Eine verfassungsrechtliche Untersuchung über Grundlage, Gegenstand und Grenzen der 
parlamentarischen Kontrolle unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der ministerialfreien Räume und 
der Privatisierung, Berlin 2007, pp. 31–32.
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dence. Consequently, only Parliament may assess the political oppor-
tuneness of minister’s actions or omissions.
Except for the inquiry committees, all other procedures (see b) are in prin-
ciple means of control in the field of the collective ministerial responsibility 
without precluding the control of individual political responsibility.
In the light of the aforementioned considerations, parliamentary respon-
sibility of the government in Greece is based on three constitutional institu-
tions: the competence of Parliament to control government (through parlia-
mentary control procedures), the obligation of government to be accountable 
to Parliament for its actions and omissions (by means of parliamentary over-
sight), and the obligation of government and its members to resign in case of 
approval of a motion of censure. Resignation of the Cabinet is the ultimate 
political penalty when the competence of Parliament to control the executive 
and the accountability obligation of government are applied.
It is interesting to highlight that the functionality and the effectiveness of 
the institution of political responsibility does not depend on whether a motion 
of censure takes place or not43. In other words, all procedural rules for mak-
ing government ministers politically responsible are considered to be of ma-
jor institutional importance44. Even “soft” control procedures, such as ques-
tions and applications to submit documents, serve the control of Cabinet’s 
work and reveal the political responsibility of Ministers. The figures show that 
an average of at least 9000 questions, 3000 petitions, 800 current questions, 
and 50 interpellations and current interpellations are submitted by MPs per 
year in the context of parliamentary oversight in the Hellenic Parliament45. 
Since the political transition from dictatorship to democracy (1974) up to now, 
twelve motions of censure have been submitted and none have been approved.
43 See Chr. Sgouritsas, Η οργάνωσις της κυβερνήσεως και η κοινοβουλευτική ευθύνη των 
υπουργών κατά το νέον Σύνταγμα της 3ης Ιουνίου 1927, Athens 1931, p. 145.
44 On other effective means of holding Cabinet responsible, see An. Loverdos, Η ποινική..., 
op.cit., p. 75.
45 See F. Fitsilis/D. Koryzis, Parliamentary control of Governmental actions on the interaction 
with European organs in the Hellenic Parliament and the National Assembly of Serbia, https://
www.researchgate.net/publication/292869609_Parliamentary_control_of_Governmental_
actions_on_the_interaction_with_European_organs_in_the_Hellenic_Parliament_and_
the_National_Assembly_of_Serbia, Table 3: Statistical data of parliamentary oversight in 
the Hellenic Parliament 2007–2015 (15.09.2018).
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III. Political ministerial responsibility in Italy
Under the tenets of Italian constitution from 1947 the government consists of 
Prime Minister and Ministers appointed by the President. Zbigniew Witkow-
ski says, that „the cabinet may also consist of wice-presidents of the Council, 
Ministers without a portfolio, undersecretaries, Cabinet Council, cross-mi-
nisterial committees and extraordinary commissioners of the governmen-
t”46. Prime Minister is responsible for leading the government. It entails ta-
king care of unified political and administrative actions of the whole cabinet. 
What is more, he coordinates all ministerial activity. It is him who takes poli-
tical responsibility for the whole government’s functioning. Ministers answer 
collectively for Cabinet’s actions and also individually. Prime Minister’s role 
among other members of the cabinet is then special, he is endowed with his 
own competences. His dominant position springs from the fact, that he can 
choose his associates. In practice, though, he needs to consult political par-
ties that form the government. What is important to note, is that constitu-
tion does not say expresis verbis that he can dismiss Ministers, what has re-
sulted in some problems with its interpretation.
Institution of political ministerial responsibility is not new to Italian con-
stitutional doctrine. It was included in the Alberta Statute from the 4th March 
1848, which, after the reunification of Italy, was in force on the whole Italian 
territory. It was the monarch who yielded all executive power (art. 5 of the 
Statute). He appointed and dismissed Ministers (art. 65 of the Statute), who 
were politically accountable to him (art.67 of the Statute)47. Ministers were 
to countersign legal acts issued by the monarch, and were politically respon-
sible before the Senate48.
In the Italian constitution from 1947 political responsibility of the govern-
ment is regulated by art. 95. Its second sentence stipulates that „ministers 
answer collectively for the Council of Ministers’ action and individually for 
46 Konstytucja Włoch, wstęp i tłum. Z. Witkowski, Warszawa 2004, s. 30; I. Bokszczanin, 
Rząd Republiki Włoskiej, [w:], Rządy w państwach Europy, E. Zieliński, I. Bokszczanin, Warszawa 
2003, s. 297–330.
47 Alberta Statute, 4th March 1848 (Lo Statuto Albertiniano – Regno di Sardegna e 
Regno d’Italia), www.quirinale.it/costituzione/Preunitarie-testi.htm (20.05.2014).
48 A. Gaca, Z. Witkowski, Podstawy ustroju konstytucyjnego Republiki Włoskiej, Toruń 
2012, s. 95–96; Z. Machelski, System polityczny Włoch, Warszawa 2010, s. 21–25.
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business conducted in their ministries”49. Moreover, according to art. 89 of 
the Constitution, ministers ale legally responsible when countersigning do-
cuments issued by the President of the Republic, because „a writ of the Pre-
sident of the Republic shall not be valid unless signed by the proposing Mi-
nister, who shall be accountable for it. A writ having force of law and other 
writs issued by virtue of a law shall be countersigned by the President of the 
Council of Ministers”.
Collective ministerial responsibility is based on the principle of coopera-
tion of all cabinet members when acting to fulfill the political agenda of the 
Council of Ministers. In accordance with the symmetric bicameralism prin-
ciple, collective ministerial responsibility entails gaining the confidence vote 
of both Houses of Parliament. Lack of support for the government in one or 
both Houses of Parliament does not result in the obligatory demission of the 
cabinet (art. 94), „if it is voted in a regular voting procedure”50. It is different, 
if at least 1/10 of members of one of the Houses of Parliament submits a mo-
tion to call a non-confidence vote for the government (art. 94, par. 5 of the 
Constitution and the so called mozione di sfiducia). Another reason for the 
demission of the cabinet is failure to pass vote of confidence, linked to the 
acceptance of an important legislative project by the Parliament and con-
nected with the political agenda of the government – the so called questione 
di fiducia – what is very precisely put down in law by the parliamentary ru-
les (art. 116 House of Deputies Rules of Procedure and art. 161 of the Senate 
Rules of Procedure)51. Then, in 24 hours from the submission of the motion, 
a roll-call vote is organized, except for other agreement between parliamen-
tary groups. It is worth noting, that this institution is used all too often in 
Italian constitutional practice. For example, it was used by II government of 
R. Prodi and IV cabinet of S. Berlusconi. E. Letty, on average, used the pro-
cedure questione di fiducia once a month. M. Renzi’s government, in the co-
urse of its first 29 months used it 62 times, among others, using it also to in-
49 Z. Witkowski, Konstytucja Republiki Włoskiej, wstęp i tłumaczenie, Warszawa 2004.
50 A. Barbera, C. Fusaro, Corso di diritto costituzionale, edizione 3, Bologna 2016, s. 364; 
G. De Vergottini, Diritto costituzionale comparato, Padova 1993, s. 599–600.
51 House of Deputies Rules of Procedure, http://www.camera.it/files/regolamento/
regolamento.pdf (20.11.2018); Senate Rules of Procedure, http://www.senato.it/documenti/
repository/istituzione/Costituzione_e_Regolamento_Senato_2018.pdf (20.11.2018).
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troduce new electoral ordinance to Parliament52. Other instrument is a vote 
of confidence motion (with a motivation for it – mozione di fiducia) where 
a roll-call vote is organized after 3 days after it is presented (art. 115 House of 
Deputies Rules of Procedure). For example, two R. Prodi’s governments re-
signed due to the lack of vote of confidence in the House of Deputies in 1998 
and in the Senate in 2008.
Individual ministerial responsibility states that each minister is responsi-
ble for the actions of their department. Italian Constitution does not contain 
a provision about the possibility of dismissal of a Minister by the Prime Mi-
nister, like German Constitution or a Spanish one. In 1986, under art. 115 par. 
3, to the House of Deputies Rules of Procedure a provision was added perta-
ining to the possibility of filing a motion for vote of no confidence for an indi-
vidual Minister (mozione di sfiducia individuale). It has been used in the case 
of the Minister of Justice in the government of L. Dini-Filippo Mancuso in 
1995. He filed a motion arguing such procedure is unconstitutional. Consti-
tutional Tribunal did not support it (ruling nb 7 from 1996). Minister Man-
cuso is the only cabinet member who has been subjected to this procedure53.
During the cabinet functioning, especially while in crisis, changes on mi-
nisterial posts can occur. They are called rimpasto. If another cabinet mem-
ber – Prime Minister or minister – is filling in the post before a new minister 
is appointed it is called interim. The procedural model for holding the cabi-
net and its ministers politically responsible adopted in Italian constitutional 
system is the institution of parliamentary control. Given that parliamenta-
ry oversight seeks to record Goverments’ acts and decisions and to highlight 
their impact on public interest in order to hold the executive accountable for 
the development, implementation and review of governmental policy, there 
are two main control instruments:
(A) Means of parliamentary control aiming at the access of Parliament 
to information on the governmental actions and omissions. Such means are 
principally the following:
1. Questions (interrogazioni). MPs have the right to submit written qu-
estions (art. 134 of the House of Deputies Rules of Procedure and 
52 A. Barbera, C. Fusaro, Corso di diritto..., op.cit., p. 365.
53 A. Barbera, C. Fusaro, Corso di diritto..., op.cit., p. 415.
127Marianthi Kalyviotou, Małgorzata Lorencka • Political ministerial responsibility
art. 153 of the Senate Rules of Procedure) or oral questions (art. 129 
of the House of Deputies Rules of Procedure and art. 148 of the Se-
nate Rules of Procedure) to Ministers regarding any matter of public 
importance (art.128 of the House of Deputies Rules of Procedure and 
art. 145 of the Senate Rules of Procedure).
2. Questions with an immediate answer (interrogazioni a risposta imme-
diata). MPs have the right to submit these questions to Ministers as 
well as the Prime Minister (on issues of current political significan-
ce. Current questions are answered and debated in the Plenum or in 
commissions (in Senate only in the Plenum) on each Wednesday. Such 
questions not only provide information to the Parliament on topical 
subjects, but also aim at supporting political dialogue on such issu-
es (Art. 139 –bis of the House of Deputies Standing Orders and Art. 
151-bis of the Senate).
3. Application to submit documents. MPs have the right to make a re-
quest, in writing, to Ministers to supply (within a set period of time) 
them with official documents related to issues of public importance.
4. Summons to the Ministers. The Parliament may call Minister(s) to ap-
pear in Parliament, either in Plenum or in parliamentary committe-
es, in order to provide clarifications and explanations for specific ac-
tions or omissions.
5. Petitions. Citizens (individuals or groups) may address Parliament in 
writing to make complaints or requests (even on private issues of re-
stricted public interest). All the above mentioned procedures are prin-
cipal means of control of the individual ministerial responsibility.
6. Announcements and Declarations of the Government or Governmen-
tal Reporting. The Prime Minister and Ministers may inform the Par-
liament about any major public matter.
(B) Means of parliamentary control aiming directly at scrutiny and criticism 
of executive actions and omissions. Such means are principally the following:
1. Interpellations. MPs have the right to individually or jointly address in-
terpellations to any Minister(s) or to the Prime Minister asking to expla-
in the scope and the motives of governmental actions or omissions.
2. Debate outside the Order of the Day. They refer to national matters or 
matters of general interest.
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3. Inquiry committees or Investigation committees. The Plenum may 
establish investigation committees consisting of MPs, who are called 
to investigate issues of public interest, primarily when there are su-
spicions of offences committed by state government highest officials.
4. Motion of confidence or Motion of no confidence.
5. Individual motion of no confidence.
IV. Conclusions
As the above paper illustrates, one of the main characteristics of political mi-
nisterial responsibility is that it inevitably concerns two spheres, the sphere 
of politics and the sphere of law, since it involves the subject matter of politi-
cally opportune ministerial action and in parallel it is regulated by the Con-
stitution and the Standing Orders. The parliamentary procedure for making 
government ministers politically responsible demonstrates such character of 
the institution. It also underlines that political ministerial responsibility is 
based on the relations, which typically reflect the parliamentary system inc-
luding the separation of powers. Thus, the institution of political ministerial 
responsibility is not solely, not even necessarily54, founded on Art. 85 of the 
Hellenic Constitution or Art. 95 of the Italian Constitution. Even if that pro-
vision was repealed, political ministerial responsibility would have adequate 
constitutional basis on the parliamentary system55, which states that the Ca-
binet derives its democratic legitimacy from its ability to command the con-
fidence of the Parliament, and is also held accountable to the Parliament, and 
on the doctrine of the separation of powers and the principle of checks and 
balances56, under which the Cabinet has to justify itself to Parliament in re-
spect of everything it does or causes the administration to do.
54 See also, H. Klein, Kommentierung zu Art. 43 GG, [in:] Grundgesetz, Kommentar, eds. 
Th. Maunz, G. Dürig, München, Supplement 2010, par. 35–118 (par. 35): „parlamentarische 
Verantwortlichkeit ist kein Spezifikum parlamentarischer Regierungssysteme, sondern ein 
essentielles Institut der repräsentativen Demokratie“.
55 See Ph. Spyropoulos, Ερμηνεία επί του άρθρου 45, [in collective work-Kommentar:] 
Σύνταγμα, κατ’ άρθρο ερμηνεία, Athens–Thessaloniki 2017, p. 1314.
56 See K. Mavrias, Συνταγματικό..., op.cit., p. 584, J. Schmidt, Die demokratische 
Legitimationsfunktion..., op.cit., p. 38.
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